

# SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND INSECURITY MANAGEMENT: CONTEXT, CONTENT AND CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA

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## **ABSTRACT**

*The resurgence of high profile crimes within the polity and the ineffective response by the national security apparatus have reignited the debate on the need to decentralize the police and allied security organizations in Nigeria. This article critically examined the operational structure and implications of national security management in Nigeria using the theoretical framework of concentric circle. The paper argued that the extant centralized and reactionary security system in the country embodies dysfunctional systemic implications that perpetuate violent insecurity. In tune with the concentric circles postulations, the paper identified the individuals as the centerpiece from where the household, community, the local government area, the state and the federation evolve and revolve as security circles of different radii. It posited that security concerns are in circles and actors within each circle are better attuned to concentrate and manage the security challenge therein. Accordingly, it underscored the need for decentralization of the police and other state-owned agencies of internal security management in order to mitigate the upsurge in crime and violence including those emanating from armed robbers, political assassins, ransom kidnappers, oil thieves, and Islamic insurgents among others.*

**Keywords:** Violence; Criminality; Centralized policing; Ineffective national security; Nigeria

## **INTRODUCTION**

Since the Peace of the Westphalia in 1684, the modern state had been generally presented as a people organized for law and development in a given territory. The elements of the people, law and order, territory and development are encapsulated in sovereignty to operate. However, the state is not an end in itself because it serves some

utilitarian purposes especially ensuring a secured people for development. Imobighe (2003) adduced that a secured state is one that is reasonably free from, or not exposed to external aggression and internal sabotage (also see Patrick, 2011). Fundamentally, state security operates at two levels - the internal and external environments. These

environments encapsulate all operational elements of national power which usually inform a state's national security strategy. Tang (2004) argued that if we assume a state to be a rational actor that chooses its security environment, then we must come to the conclusion that for a state to adopt a particular security strategy, it has to go through a three-stage process, namely assessment, planning, and implementation. Implicitly then, if a state commits mistakes in any one of the three stages, it will be unlikely to adopt a fitting strategy.

In recent years, the Nigerian state has been under severe insecurity which has substantially undermined law and order as well as the protection of lives and property. In fact, since the transition to civil rule in 1999 violent insecurity has surged with different perpetrators such as militants, kidnappers, cultists, pirates and terrorists. In the Niger Delta in the South-south geo-political zone, grievance over injustice in oil wealth distribution and environmental degradation had led to militancy in much of the 1990s and 2000s (Pegg and Zabbey, 2013). Beyond the oil-producing Niger Delta, the North-central zone has been turbulent owing to incessant conflicts between 'indigenes' and 'settlers', farmers and herders, as well as Christians and Muslims (Aghedo and Osumah, 2014). The Boko Haram terrorism represents the greatest threat to lives, investments and even the existence of the Nigerian state in recent years. The extremist group which is domiciled in the North-eastern zone rebels against the state in the hope of creating a theocracy based on *Sharia* law (Aghedo, 2014).

The sources, dynamics and impact of these varying forms of insecurity especially

those emanating from non-state actors have attracted enormous attention of scholars and policy-makers alike (Agbiboa, 2013; Wiwa, 2009). However, the role played by the state's security architecture has not been adequately examined. Yet the nature and configuration of the security agencies have not only been a source of insecurity as shown by the several cases of arbitrary arrests, human rights violation and extra-judicial murders but they also contribute to the inability of the state to effectively mitigate pervasive insecurity in the world's most populous Black nation. This article therefore attempts to fill the aforementioned gap by critically examining the challenges emanating from the centralization of Nigeria's security agencies and why violence is ubiquitous in the country.

## **CONCEPTUALIZATION AND EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM**

For any analytical consideration, security is a normative and emotionally laden idea, with no independent meaning but related to a context and a specific individual or societal value system and its realization (Brauch, 2008; Mesjasz, 2004). Security in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values. The traditional notion of national security places emphasis on the protection of state's sovereignty and territorial integrity against domestic and external threats. However, in the last decade of the Twentieth Century the Bretton Woods institutions upheld that the state-centric notion of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on human security. That

is, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (Watson, 2011; Human Development Report, 1993).

Security according to this people-centred conception means safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the pattern of daily lives - whether in homes, in jobs, in communities or in environment (Kumssa and Jones, 2010). Brauch (2004), having critically examined the concept, concludes that the political and scientific concept of security has changed with the international order. It stands to reason that the conventional concept of security wherein the state is both the object of security and the primary provider of security falls short of a comprehensive and an adequate consideration of the phenomenal essence of security.

Pam (2005), adopting the Human Security Report, notes that the term 'human security' defines security in terms of an integrated idea of positive peace, human rights and sustainable development. It is related to the enhancement of livelihood of all people at risk, the values of the respect of human rights, the dignity of the individual, respect for diversity, community empowerment, decentralized forms of government, peace and coexistence and the accountability and transparency of actions aimed at the betterment of livelihood (Human security Report, 2003; Ikonne, *et al* 2005:61). The promotion of human security is realized ultimately through freedom from want and fear. The realization of human securitization clearly requires multiple

efforts, all of which should be integrated and linked to the ultimate goal of providing for the sanctity of life and liberty (Watson, 2011; Liotta, 2002).

National security has been construed in different ways each of which emphasizes vital factors underlining the idea. Brennan (1961) holds that national security is the protection of national survival; while Ray (1987) argues that national security is to be understood in terms of the desire and capacity for self defense. To Goldstein (1999), national security is closely connected with the preservation of the borders of a state as mainly construed in terms of the power to maintain a government's sovereignty within its territory as well as the avoidance of conflicts and the preservation of the lives of people in the society. However, O'Brien (1995) in explicating a somewhat different idea of national security argues that security is construed as more than just safety from the violence of rival militaries. It is the absence of violence whether military, economic, environmental or sexual. In recent years, security has been conceived in terms of how much freedom the people enjoy. Accordingly, it has been associated with freedom from danger to life and property and the presence of conducive atmosphere for the people to pursue their legitimate interests within the society (Sen, 1999; Bassey, 2004; Imobighe, 1990).

Human security therefore requires rules and impartial adjudication and application which can hardly exist without due provision of adequate national security. Indeed, aggressive and repressive states can be major sources of human insecurity and a greater cause of human travail. National security is therefore concerned about those

governmental institutions that seek to ensure the physical protection and safety of their citizens, ensuring equal access to the law and protection from abuse. From the foregoing, both the state-centric notion of security and the new variant that stresses human security are two sides of the same coin as they are mutually reinforcing (Idowu, 2013). However, there are two sets of government systems and institutions concerned with national security. The first component consists of the traditional instruments of national security, namely the criminal justice system (police, justice and correctional services/prisons; the military and the intelligence community). The second, and more important, relates to the nature of governance, its institutions and rules, norms and values that underpin it, as well as the efficacy thereof (Cillier, 2004; Pam, 2005).

The security threats and challenges in Nigeria are enormous, strategic and evident but have never been as precarious and alarming as in this generation. The growing incidence of hostage-taking and kidnapping, militant insurgencies, pipeline vandalism, ethnic insurrections, fatal inter- and intra-community conflicts, inter- and intra-religious wars, illegal arms trafficking, armed banditry, political violence and gangsterism, the quality and quantity of ordinance on charge to militant insurgents and hoodlums, the courage and zeal usually exhibited by bandits in their nefarious activities, the spate of unemployment, the state of poverty among the citizens, the infrastructural and institutional collapse and the obvious ineffective state response are veritable indicators of the scale of insecurity in Nigeria today. These indices also indicate that the national security

architecture may have fallen short of the security objectives.

### **CONCENTRIC CIRCLE THEORY**

The analogy of concentric circles provides an appropriate theoretic lens for understanding the efficacy or otherwise of Nigerian security architecture. Concentric circles are circles that lie in the same plain and have the same centre but different radii. In recent years, it has been assumed that security tasks and praxis operate at various levels of environment and with a relationship analogous to concentric circles (Russet *et al*, 2004). Viewed this way, the actors in each of the levels or circles constitute a 'security community' which should concentrate on the security of that community before considering those of contiguous environments. In contemporary International Relations, it is suggested that nations should focus primarily on their internal security first; followed by those of their neighbouring or contiguous sub-regions before strategically getting involved in international security concerns.

Scholars have adopted the concentric circles analogy in explaining various developments and relations among nations in the international system, arguing that the world is divided into states, each of which has its clearly defined territory and borders. However, Hullse (2006) argued that one can conceive of boundaries not only as clear cut borderlines but also as a frontier and as a more ambiguous 'in-between' space. Here, differentiation is understood to be more like a continuum than a binary opposition. From this perspective, the other security community is different in degree or size rather than in kind. And between these

frontiers are large zones of transition where the self and other overlap in multiple ways.

Hullse (2006) used this analogy in explaining the European Union integration processes and indicated that a variety of metaphors is in use to capture the European Union multiple borders including 'Patch Work' Europe, 'layered frontier Zones', 'variable geometry' and 'Concentric circles'. He contended that while all the concentric circles make a clear distribution between those inside and those outside the respective circles, when taken together make it difficult to differentiate between the self and other. The clear cut line becomes an ambiguous frontier zone. And actors can be outside a circle for a certain purpose and yet inside for others.

Similarly, Vogt (1990) adopted the concentric circle theory in analyzing the Nigerian post-independence defence policy. He observed that the emphasis by Nigerian government on inoperable objectives such as the safeguarding of territorial integrity of all African countries, as contained in the Adedeji Report, led to criticism that Nigeria had set both foreign and defence policy goals which she did not have the resources to realize. The concentric circle theory was therefore proposed as a strategy designed to bring defence policy planning to an operable level and to reflect priorities in terms of the weight that should be given to the various levels of interest.

This was not to advocate the abandonment of the larger Africa's interests, but to say that Nigeria cannot take on itself the responsibility of guaranteeing African security without first ensuring the security of its own territorial boundaries, of the states contiguous to it,

of the West African sub-region before operating with confidence at the regional level. Thus, a security vacuum is created when the focus of foreign and defence policies are at the regional level while leaving security vacuums at the sub-regional and national levels. Nigeria's national security interests and objectives must be redefined so that the security of Nigerian territory will constitute the last line of defence with the security of states contiguous to Nigeria as the next, the West African sub-region coming next, and the security of the African countries as the first line of defence.

## **CHALLENGES OF NIGERIAN NATIONAL SECURITY DELIVERY SYSTEM**

The statutory responsibility of National security in Nigeria is vested in the President (the executive arm of government) through all such security agencies established by law. As noted by Fayemi and Olonisakin (2008:245), Nigeria's security sector comprises the following:

- i. The armed forces (army, air force and navy of approximately 77,000 personnel);
- ii. The Nigerian police service (of about 360,000 men and women – increased in 1999 from the initial size of 120,000);
- iii. Paramilitary bodies including customs and exercise, the immigration service, intelligence services –including military intelligence and the state security services;

- iv. Judicial and state service bodies – judiciary, justice ministry, correctional service (prison);
- v. Private security outfits;
- vi. Militia groups –including, for example the Odua People’s Congress, Bakassi Boys, Hizba Corps;
- vii. Community vigilante groups.

Constitutionally, the armed forces, police and prisons are answerable to the federal government because they are under the exclusive and legislative list. For example, despite the existence of police commands in the 36 states of the federation as well as the FCT Abuja, the central decision-making authority over the police rests with the Inspector General of police who is answerable directly to the President (Fayemi and Olonisakin, 2008). The non-formal security organizations also respond to the security needs of communities.

Some measures taken to ensure national security include using diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats; marshalling economic power to facilitate or compel co-operation; maintaining effective armed forces; implementing civil defence and emergency preparedness (including anti-terrorism legislation); ensuring the resilience and redundancy of critical infrastructure; using intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and espionage; and protecting classified information and using counter-intelligence services or secret Police to protect the nation from internal threats (Bachmann, 2014; Osumah and Aghedo, 2010; Okeke, 2004). The National security apparatus, however, operates at two levels - the external and internal security

considerations. Ordinarily securing the state from external threats is principally the responsibility of the Nigeria Armed Forces, while the internal security responsibilities are vested mainly in the Nigeria Police and her offshoot services.

Though intellectual works on doctrines of national security are hard to come by, it is possible to identify two distinctive approaches as far as the management of national security is concerned namely, the military and related coercive response; and the progressive (Ekoko and Vogt, 1990; Imobighe, 1990). These two methods are equivalents and are variously described as operational and strategic, responsive and preventive, reactive and proactive respectively (Bassey, 2004; Nweke, 2002; Safir, 2003). However, Green (2006) adduced an intelligent combination of both for optimum achievement. This may constitute a third and perhaps better doctrine.

With regard to the military approach to national security, Ochoche (1998) holds that national security focuses on the amassment of military armaments, personnel and expenditure. The military approach to security is often justified on the basis that only a strong military force can deter attacks and provide the means of fighting undeterred attacks. However, it should be noted here that in the case of Nigeria, the vast size of the military has not resulted in a corresponding increase in the maintenance of its traditional functions, which Heywood (1997) rightly identifies as the maintenance of security and territorial integrity of the state and society; the maintenance of domestic and civil order; and the provision of humanitarian services.

Contrary to popular and reasonable expectations, the military in Nigeria has been used for largely negative purposes including the oppression, terrorization and repression of the citizens. Indeed, the military has been used to curtail the activities of unions, opposition groups and popular demonstrations and movements, making it more an instrument of censorship. This trend has been particularly prevalent under military regimes. Therefore, Heywood (1997) concludes that rather than be the solution to Nigeria's national security, development and national integration problems, the military has compounded and perpetuated them. The failure of the military to fulfill its constitutional role has made the military to be distracted and has failed to distinguish itself in the political realm of life into which it has intruded (Ochoche, 1998).

No doubt, national security delivery by the police and military has been confronted by different challenges for both the society and these principal security agencies themselves. For example, many security agents have been convicted of aiding and abetting such criminalities as oil theft, armed robbery, kidnapping, and even terrorism (Marenin, 1987; Osumah and Aghedo, 2010; Hills, 2012). Also, because securitization is centered on speculative threats to the state and government which may not necessarily occur rather than the wellbeing of the people and environment, the State deliberately or otherwise has positioned itself to fail in its primary obligation of ensuring the security of its people. This has facilitated outrageous budgetary allocation and votes on security without guaranteeing security. In Nigeria, 'security

votes' have become a major conduit of political elite corruption because such funds are unaccounted for and unquestionable (Obiamaka *et al*, 2012). Security in essence, has become a mirage and a culture of insecurity has evolved over the years. This has largely eroded professionalism in the agencies leading to elite privatization.

Owing to privatization, security praxis has been secluded from the assurance of the wellbeing of the people and national development. And it has been associated with the security of the state and individuals in government. Security has become commoditized, commercialized and made ordinarily inaccessible to the masses. This in itself has resulted in the bifurcation of society into those that have security and those that have not, with the implicit tension and crisis therein. For instance, the former Inspector General of Police, Mr. Ogbonna Onovo disclosed that there had been huge illegal deployments of Police personnel to private individuals by some high ranking officers of the Nigeria Police largely for pecuniary motives. Similarly, former Rivers State Governor Peter Odili was alleged to have used members of Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) as his personal electioneering thugs. At the same time, the security personnel harass, oppress, subdue, deprive and dominate the poor and vulnerable citizenry, while the 'big men' or 'grand patrons' are insulated from such treatments.

In a very fundamental sense, national security is a public good and not the private property of the state or of particular dominant interests. According to Luckham (1998), there exists a tension or contradiction between the manifest

and latent functions of security. This is especially the case where the military is employed as an instrument of state coercion to oppress, exploit, extort and terrorize the citizenry. Central to the failure of the military approach to national security in Nigeria has been that situation in which, as Hutchful (1998) says, the military has failed to achieve operational efficiency, institutional solidarity and stability. In our view, other crucial factors that led to the failure of the military to uphold the principles of truth, justice, respect for human life and compassion towards other human beings in the society.

The unprofessionalism of the security agencies has also resulted in the infliction of pain upon the offender through coercion. This 'organized hurt' becomes very clear in capital offenses where society takes the lives of offenders convicted of murder, armed robbery or treason. This implies that society is doing the wrong it forbids its citizens, though upon stated rationalization. The approach perceives crime as inevitable and the fight against it perpetual. This application of violence embodies inherent tendencies of replicating and escalating violence. As criminals notice and encounter fire power as a veritable factor in the success or otherwise of the nefarious operations against the restraints from the law enforcement agents, the criminals endeavour to criminally acquire weapons considered superior to those in charge for routine law enforcement duties. With such weaponry criminals are emboldened to even confront law enforcement officers in gun battles to enable them commit

crime. This is the situation in Nigeria where the war against criminals has escalated with sophistication and usually with fatal collateral damage.

Indeed, even though the country has 37 state police commands, 106 area commands, 925 police divisions, 2,190 police stations and over 360,000 personnel, the Nigeria police service remains incapable of providing security for Nigeria's over 170 million populations. In fact, the country's police-citizens ratio of 1:1,000 is one of the lowest in the world and falls grossly below the United Nations stipulation of 1:400. Added to personnel shortage, the police institution grapples with the challenges of "inadequate accommodation and transportation, poor communication networks, poorly funded training institutions and insufficient criminal intelligence gathering capacity" (Fayemi and Olonisaki, 2008:252). These challenges confronting security personnel have bred pervasive corruption among them. For example, the Nigeria Police has a global "reputation for brutality, corruption and arbitrariness" (Fayemi and Olonisakin, 2008:258). This has led to entrenched militarism in social relations which undermines peaceful, amicable and consensual resolution of problems, thereby encouraging frequent recourse to arms and culture of violence.

However, considering the advancement of tactics employed by criminals and the caliber of weaponry on charge to these criminals, (going by the reactionary system) it would require the deployment of a higher than conventional category of weaponry for use by the anti-crime personnel. This may mean the application of light bombs, thunder blasts, light artillery and armoured ordnance

in routine internal security activities. This shall amount to running a militarized state with its attendant ills and anti-social democratic implications. This scenario is

already evident in Nigeria with the country's sizeable importation of arms compared with other African states (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Arms Exporters to Sub-Saharan Africa, 2006-2010**

| Rank | Supplier      | Largest recipient (share of exports) | Other recipients                                                                                                                     | Number of recipients |
|------|---------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1    | China         | <b>Nigeria (35%)</b>                 | Benin, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe | 16                   |
| 2    | Ukraine       | Chad (28%)                           | Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe                            | 9                    |
| 3    | Russia        | Sudan (77%)                          | Chad, Niger, Senegal, Uganda                                                                                                         | 5                    |
| 4    | Italy         | <b>Nigeria (77%)</b>                 | Namibia, Tazania, Zambia                                                                                                             | 4                    |
| 5    | South Africa  | Gabon (58%)                          | Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Tazania, Uganda                                                                      | 8                    |
| 6    | Belarus       | Sudan (94%)                          | Eritrea                                                                                                                              | 2                    |
| 7    | Moldova       | Angola (100%)                        | -                                                                                                                                    | 1                    |
| 8    | Jordan        | Kenya (100%)                         | -                                                                                                                                    | 1                    |
| 9    | United States | Congo, Dem. Rep. (56%)               | Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana                                                                            | 6                    |
| 10   | Singapore     | <b>Nigeria (96%)</b>                 | Chad                                                                                                                                 | 2                    |

**Source:** Taylor and Wu (2013: 464)

The crave for acquisition of superior weaponry by criminals and state security apparatus respectively in order to gain better bargain in the war on crime could result in a systematic 'arms race' between the two 'forces' (as is almost the case now) with consequent budgetary and cost implications. Besides, the violent dimension of the war against criminals and the violent battles rather indicate the 'MADness' in the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) of lives and property within the state by its own citizens avowed to take their position sternly on crime in spite of obviously known fatal consequences to lives and investments.

The unrestricted use of arms in everyday life within the community by contenders in the war on crime makes the seeming enigma in weaponry a common and everyday experience to the people. This gradually develops a social psyche of 'arms power' is 'right'; its use is 'normal'. This explains why and how arms are now easily used even in facilitating less serious crimes as examination malpractices, rape, and trespass on land, malicious damage, and many more.


The reactionary policing system centres on the beat patrol. Inherently this requires mobilization of a large number of personnel with requisite logistics to cover

the area of security responsibility (the beats). Paradoxically, criminals would carefully avoid such covered areas and strike elsewhere considered safe for them; otherwise criminals may dare the might of the security personnel and gain access. In either case, the essence of the beat patrol is seriously infringed if not defeated, and man-hours and resources wasted, while crime may not even be deterred as rationalized. The unhealthy perception of the law enforcement agents by the public by whatever reasons makes to alienate the agents from the public due to loss of confidence and suspicion. This deprives the Police the public support it needs to be effective in policing the community. The gamut of the nature of administration of criminal justice, the dominant demeanour of offenders and the nature of punishment rather facilitate in most cases the recycling of criminals in society. The approach is inherently prone to overt conflicts among law enforcement agencies, inter agencies distrust, withholding of information and wanton rivalry as these agencies are systematically plunged into a 'war' of power superiority. Thus, the war on crime poses challenges for all parties involved - the state, the criminals, the victims of crime and the general public.

## **EXPLAINING THE CENTRALIZATION OF SECURITY ARCHITETURE**

The major explanation for the upsurge in the scale of violent insecurity and the poor delivery of Nigeria's security architecture is the centralization of security apparatus. This partly relates to the historical evolution and philosophy of the security services. The Nigeria Police Force was created by the British colonialists to deal with the 'troublesome natives'. Originating from the West African Frontier Force, the Police was centralized and oriented towards ensuring compliance with the imperial Acts of 1807 and 1833 which abolished slavery and slave trade as well as achieving the colonial objectives of 'divide and rule' and for facilitating the passage of raw materials to the metropole (Jemibewon, 2001). However, over five decades since Nigeria got political independence, the country's security architecture remains structurally centralized with damning consequences for management of crime and insecurity at the grassroots. Despite persistent agitations for community and state policing so that local people familiar with the language, geography and socio-political terrains will be in charge of security, the federal government continues to hold on to the police and armed forces tenaciously (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1:** National Security Architecture



Yet between 1960 and 1967, the Nigerian federation was 'bottom-heavy' as the three regions maintained effective control in their areas of jurisdiction. They had their own regional constitutions coupled with the federal constitution. They also

had their own police and prison systems in addition to liaison offices in the United Kingdom. The regions had a strong self-sustaining agricultural economic base of their own. They set up their own universities: Ahmadu Bello University at

Zaria in the North; University of Ife at Ile-Ife in the West; and the University of Nigeria at Nsukka in the East. These universities were established with little or no Federal Government interference. The regions had their own principles of government in line with their local culture. For example, while women were allowed to exercise their voting rights in the Southern elections, their counterparts in the North were disenfranchised. A fourth region was added to this tripartite structure with the creation of the Mid-West Region on August 9, 1963.

However, the intrusion of the military into politics disrupted the functioning of Nigerian federalism. The country experienced military coups in 1966 (January and July), 1975, 1976, 1983, 1985 and 1993) as well as a civil war (1967-1970). These long years of military rule resulted in the hyper-centralization of power (including the police and armed forces) and resources at the federal level. For example, the regional constitutions which existed between 1960 and 1967 were abolished; the regional police formations were centralized; the universities established by the regions were taken over; the local government system of administration was unified; and a Land Use Decree was promulgated in 1978 ceding the ownership of all lands to the government (Aghedo and Osumah, 2009). These were some of the features that characterized military rule and dismantled Nigerian federalism (Ekeh, 2007; Ayode, 1997). This over-centralization was made possible by the oil boom of the early 1970s which made the first phase of Nigerian military government (1966-1979) to be awash with enormous oil rents. During this

period, the application of the federal character principle was badly assaulted; revenue allocation became terribly centralized.

Indeed, the eras of military dictatorship resulted in numerous state and locality creation exercises: the four regions of the country were re-organized into twelve states in 1967 by the Gowon-led military administration. This number was further increased to nineteen in 1976, to twenty one in 1987, to thirty in 1991, and the current thirty-six state structure in 1996. Till date, there is agitation for further state and locality creation amongst Nigeria's different ethno-regional and linguistic groups. In 2014, the National Conference recommended that additional 18 states should be created to make Nigeria a federation of 54 states (National Conference Report, 2014). Paradoxically, the fragmentation of Nigerian federation results in more centralization because the sub-national units are not viable and so necessarily rely on the central government for survival. For example, it has been alleged that only three of the current 36 states can pay their workers' salaries in a month without recourse to the monthly revenue disbursement from the central government. Thus, sub-national units only serve as access to power positions and participation in the sharing of political and economic goods especially oil rents – the so-called 'national cake'.

## CONCLUSION

The state of insecurity in Nigeria has substantially evidenced that the national security architecture has fallen short of the national security objectives. It is therefore

imperative to institutionalize a dominantly proactive national security strategy founded on human security. In tandem with the concentric circles analysis, it is expedient that securitization and security management be decentralized to the formal security circles of the federal, states, local government areas and even communities that could cope with the requirements as may be stipulated by law. In essence, every level of government that is authorized by law to make rules and regulations should also have authority to have and administer a law enforcement apparatus to execute such laws, rules, or regulations.

In consideration of the ideals of security and the concentric circle theory of security, security management systems should operate as much as practicable in security circles otherwise known as security communities as may be applicable in the given environment. In the Nigerian circumstance these security circles could be identified in the individuals, households, communities, local government areas, states and the federal level. It then means and

requires that security management should be organized and administered critically in all these circles to make for optimum national security delivery. Incidentally, this is contrary to the constitutional position in Nigeria where security is exclusively placed on the central government at the moment.

This arrangement estranges the smaller security circles from the security responsibilities in their immediate environment. But because securitization at the centre may not acknowledge the peculiar security challenges within some of these smaller circles, such security issues are often left unsecuritized. This has the implication of perpetuating insecurity in the country. The paradox of this circumstance is that faced with persistent insecurity in the smaller circles, actors in such circles are often constrained to resort to self help. This is the situation in Nigeria where local non-formal security forces abound in the forms of local vigilantes, ethno-religious militias which operate openly in contravention of the provisions of the constitution of the federation.

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